While the war on terror has been America’s largest and most publicized attempt to root out foreign enemies this century, the quest to identify and destroy real or imagined threats to national security has long been a part of US history. Indeed, since the onset of the United States' overseas empire at the dawn of the twentieth century, it has pursued enemies in places of strategic interest around the globe: the remote islands of the Philippines, the US southern border, hemispheric hot spots in Central and South America, and the greater Middle East. The common depiction of these kinds of foes—private actors who did not formally represent the countries they fought for—has maintained a remarkable consistency over time. The only difference is that enemies who used to be called “bandits” then are now more often referred to as “terrorists.” The widespread use of such terms, which connote an illegitimacy of both cause and means, also has served to blunt deeper considerations of US foreign engagements. Drawing on six case studies, Michael E. Neagle spotlights the commonalities of how the United States has leveraged popular understandings of “bandits” to justify incursions abroad as well as rally popular and political support at home.