This book examines Indonesiäs post-Aceh tsunami disaster management through the lens of a multifaceted foreign policy decision-making process involving a variety of bureaucratic actors. It argues that organizational structure and bargaining aspects are as important as power and interests in explaining foreign policy making in the Indonesian context. When the Aceh tsunami struck in late 2004, the use of foreign military assets in responding to natural disasters was not a common feature in Indonesian history¿Jakarta remained reticent to engage foreign military enclaves within its own territories. This greatly affected Indonesiäs security cooperation with other countries, including Australia. Prior to the Aceh tsunami, natural disaster management was a domestic political issue. The unprecedented decision by the government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to approve foreign military assistance for military operations other than war (MOOTW) in Aceh was a result of domestic and international factors. This book addresses timely yet fundamental questions about Indonesian foreign policy decision making that led to the involvement of foreign militaries in the country¿s worst-ever natural disaster. As a former colony that prized the value of non-interference, the Indonesian government had to make a difficult decision about whether to accept offers of international assistance from countries including Australia. With this, the book explores why the Indonesian government decided to approve Australian humanitarian assistance following the 2004 Aceh tsunami, and how governmental agencies managed this assistance.