Inspired by the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this collection of essays from across the common law world is concerned with two separate but related themes. First, to what extent and by what means should review on substantive grounds such as unreasonableness be expanded and intensified? Jowell, Elliott and Varuhas all agree with Taggart that proportionality should not 'sweep the rainbow', but propose different schemes for organising and conceptualising substantive review. Groves and Weeks, and Hoexter evaluate the state of substantive review in Australia and South Africa respectively.
The second theme concerns the broader (Canadian) sense of substantive review including the illegality grounds, and whether deference should extend to these grounds. Cane and Aronson consider the relevance and impact of different constitutional and doctrinal settings. Wilberg and Daly address questions concerning when and how deference is to operate once it is accepted as appropriate in principle.
Rights-based review is discussed in a separate third part because it raises both of the above questions. Geiringer, Sales and Walters examine the choices to be made in settling the approach in this area, each focusing on a different dichotomy.
Taggart's work is notable for treating these various aspects of substantive review as parts of a broader whole, and for his search for an appropriate balance between judicial scrutiny and administrative autonomy across this entire area. By bringing together essays on all these topics, this volume seeks to build on that approach.
Responding to and build on the work of Professor Michael Taggart, this book brings together essays on two contrasting issues concerning the scope and intensity of substantive grounds of review. Firstly, whether and to what extent review on substantive grounds such as unreasonableness, proportionality and substantive legitimate expectations should be expanded and intensified; and secondly, whether review on illegality grounds should ever retreat from the usual correctness standard. Fundamental rights as grounds of review raise both of these questions and a separate part is devoted to them. Taggart's support for expansion of substantive grounds of review was of a piece with his recognition of the need for judicial restraint or deference in appropriate contexts. The latter took the form both of his ultimate opposition to proportionality as a ground for review in non-rights cases, and of his support for varying intensity review under the illegality heading. Such awareness of the bigger picture and the need for balance within it is in short supply in the literature. This book is intended to continue Taggart's work in putting the pieces of the jigsaw back together.
It seems to me that this book is best seen as a very well-crafted statement of the "state of play" in intensity of review across the common law world. The chapters summarising the past work of Taggart and other important scholars in the area provide a useful entry point to those not entirely familiar with this corner of administrative law scholarship, and the rest of the book expands on that foundation in many different (and interesting) directions, in ways that will be useful to newcomers and experienced administrative lawyers alike.
